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Variations of the self-imposed delay-of-gratification situation in preschool were compared to deter-
mine when individual differences in this situation may predict aspects of cognitive and self-regula-
tory competence and coping in adolescence. Preschool children from a university community
participated in experiments that varied features of the self-imposed delay situation. Experimental
analyses of the cognitive-attentional processes that affect waiting in this situation helped identify
conditions in which delay behavior would be most likely to reflect relevant cognitive and atten-
tional competencies. As hypothesized, in those conditions, coherent patterns of statistically signifi-
cant correlations were found between seconds of delay time in such conditions in preschool and
cognitive and academic competence and ability to cope with frustration and stress in adolescence.
To be able to delay immediate satisfaction for the sake of
future consequences has long been considered an essential
achievement of human development. After a series of investiga-
tions into the individual differences associated with the choice
to delay gratification (e.g., Klineberg, 1968; Mischel, 1958,
1961a, 1961b, 1966; Mischel & Metzner, 1962; Schack & Mas-
sari, 1973; Walls & Smith, 1970), research turned to the pro-
cesses underlying the ability to sustain self-imposed delay of
gratification after the initial choice has been made (e.g, Mis-
chel, 1974,1981; Toner & Smith, 1977). In a recent follow-up
study, preschool children who delayed gratification longer in
the self-imposed delay paradigm (e.g., Mischel, Ebbesen, &
Zeiss, 1972) were described more than 10 years later by their
parents as adolescents who were significantly more competent
(Mischel, Shoda, & Peake, 1988). Specifically, when these chil-
dren became adolescents, their parents rated them as more aca-
demically and socially competent, verbally fluent, rational, at-
tentive, planful, and able to deal well with frustration and
stress. The study suggested that long-term prediction may be
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possible from the self-imposed delay paradigm, adding to a
growing tradition of research devoted to the identification of
stability and coherence throughout development (e.g., Block,
1971; Caspi, Elder, & Bern, 1987; Erickson, Sroufe, & Egeland,
1985; Kagan & Moss, 1962). However, the small sample size
required combining the different experimental situations in
which delay behavior was measured. Therefore, it was not possi-
ble to compare major variations of the self-imposed delay situa-
tion to examine the characteristics that might render it more or
less predictive of the obtained long-term outcomes. The present
study is an effort to overcome this constraint.
In the present study, we attempted to identify the particular
psychological conditions in which children's delay of gratifica-
tion behavior is more likely to predict relevant individual dif-
ferences in developmental outcomes. The identification of
these conditions, which may be considered "diagnostic" (Quat-
trone & Tversky, 1984; Tversky & Hutchinson, 1986), is derived
directly from the theoretical and experimental analyses of the
cognitive-attentional processes that enable the young child to
delay (e.g, Mischel, 1974,1981,1984). For this reason, we sup-
plemented the original follow-up sample with a second, larger
wave of outcome data collected about 3 years later, and thereby
almost doubled the available number of respondents. The new
follow-up wave also added expanded rating measures of both
cognitive and coping competence, as well as Scholastic Apti-
tude Test (SAT) scores. These new data allowed us to compare
long-term correlates of delay behavior in the major variations of
the Mischel et al. (1972) self-imposed delay situations.
An important variation in the original preschool delay situa-
tions was whether or not the reward objects were more salient
(i.e, exposed vs. obscured) during the delay period. In an exten-
sive series of experiments (Mischel, 1974,1981) to clarify the
basic processes allowing young children to delay gratification,
it was found that for children at this age (about 4.5 years old),
physically exposing the rewards appears to increase the ten-
dency to have arousing, consumatory thoughts about them.
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This tendency could be overcome, however, when children
used effective cognitive strategies during the delay period, for
example, by distracting themselves from the arousing qualities
of the rewards or by transforming them cognitively (e.g, Mis-
chel & Baker, 1975; Mischel & Moore, 1980). Furthermore, al-
though these strategies were suggested as manipulations in the
experiments, they also seemed to be used spontaneously by
children who delayed longer.
Thus, when the rewards were exposed, preschoolers tended
to wait longer when they were given effective strategies, or when
they generated their own, for reducing the arousal while sus-
taining their goal-directed delay. Such strategies seemed to in-
volve "a combination of avoiding excessive frustration by not
focusing on the actual rewards or by transforming them to min-
imize motivational arousal, and attending instead to the sym-
bolic representation of the outcomes" (Mischel, 1974, p. 288).
Therefore, when preschoolers were not given these strategies,
their behavior in the exposed-rewards situation should have
more readily reflected any naturally occurring individual dif-
ferences in their spontaneous use of such strategies. To the de-
gree that individual differences in the child's ability to generate
effective cognitive-attentional strategies to cope with delay of
gratification are enduring and have consequences for facilitat-
ing adaptation, we expected children's preschool delay time
measured with the rewards exposed to predict later outcomes
and indices of cognitive and social competence relevant to this
ability. On the basis of the experimental analysis and the results
from the first follow-up, we expected these outcomes to include
such qualities as attentional-cognitive resourcefulness and flex-
ibility and, more generally, academic competencies, as well as
more effective, mature coping with frustration and stress (see
Mischel et al, 1988).
In comparison with the exposed-rewards condition, when
the rewards were obscured, no special strategies seemed to be
required for preschoolers to delay (e.g, Mischel, 1974). For ex-
ample, instructions to "think fun" and to self-distract did not
significantly increase delay time when the rewards were already
obscured, indicating that children in this condition were able to
spontaneously wait without such help (Mischel et al, 1972). We
therefore reasoned that children's delay behavior in this situa-
tion would be less related to their ability to generate effective
strategies for coping with the conflict because the situation did
not demand such ability. Observed variance in delay behavior,
which was still substantial, might then reflect specific motiva-
tional or other situational considerations (e.g, how much they
wanted the particular objects) rather than their ability to gener-
ate strategies for sustaining self-imposed delay. This expectation
is consistent with the view that individual differences in strate-
gies for coping with frustration or stress may be especially visi-
ble in situations that strain the coping competencies of the
individuals in them (Wright & Mischel, 1987). It is also consis-
tent with a research strategy that has begun to show consider-
able value in attachment research: Early behavioral antecedents
seem more predictive when they are assessed in situations that
tax the coping skills of the individual (Ainsworth, 1979; Waters
& Sroufe, 1983).
So far, we have considered the diagnosticity of delay behavior
when children had to rely on their own coping strategies. The
available data also include conditions in which various strate-
gies and self-instructions had been suggested to the children to
use during the waiting period (e.g, Mischel & Baker, 1975). In
those conditions, children's behavior reflected not just their
own spontaneous coping with delay but also their reactions to
the suggested strategies—strategies that sometimes were help-
ful for delay but that sometimes made delay more difficult. For
example, when the experimenter suggested an effective strategy
(e.g, to self-distract by "thinking fun" while waiting, as in Mis-
chel et al, 1972), children who followed the instruction should
have been able to wait even if they had not spontaneously dis-
tracted themselves. In contrast, when poor strategies (e.g, to
think about rewards) were suggested, children were exposed to
a potentially confusing set of strategies (e.g, following the exper-
imenter-suggested strategies vs. those they spontaneously
thought would be helpful, such as self-distraction). Thus, their
delay time should be less clearly reflective of the ability to gener-
ate effective strategies. However, complex and unpredictable
interactions may occur between the children's own spontaneous
delay strategies and the particular type of strategies suggested
to them, making it difficult to predict the potential meaning of
the child's delay behavior in those conditions. Our theoretical
predictions of greater diagnosticity therefore focused primarily
on comparisons between conditions in which the rewards were
exposed versus obscured, with no ideation suggested to the
children (i.e, their strategies were entirely spontaneous). For the
sake of completeness, however, the data for conditions in which
strategies were suggested will also be presented.
Method
Overview
Preschool children's delay of gratification behavior was assessed
during a period of approximately 6 years (1968-1974) in a series of
experiments conducted at the Bing School at Stanford University (e.g.,
Mischel & Ebbesen, 1970; Mischel, et al, 1972). In those studies, a
total of 653 children (316 boys, 337 girls) participated in at least one
experiment. About 10 years later (1981-1982), a short questionnaire
concerning the coping and cognitive competence of the children and
the California Child Q-set (CCQ) were mailed to the 125 parents
whose addresses could be located, yielding 95 respondents (see Mis-
chel et al, 1988). To expand the sample of respondents, a second follow-
up based on a more extensive address search was conducted in 1984. In
the second mailing, all parents were sent a new expanded question-
naire about coping and competence (the Adolescent Coping Question-
naire; ACQ) and a biographical information sheet on which they indi-
cated their children's SAT scores. The CCQs were also sent to those
who either did not respond to the previous mailing or did not receive
the mailing because their addresses were not available at that time.
Materials were mailed to parents of 506 subjects. This yielded re-
sponses from parents of 90 subjects whose data were not available in
the first-wave follow-up, as well as additional data from the parents
who had responded in the first mailing. As a result, the sample for
which CCQ was available increased from 67 to 165, and we obtained
parental ratings on the new 14-item ACQ for 134 children, as well as
reports of 94 children's SAT scores. Together with the first-wave mail-
ing, a sample of 185 children was now available on whom there was at
least one follow-up measure.1
1 Of the 653 original subjects, 103 were not tested in a standard self-
imposed delay situation and therefore were not used. Of the remaining
550, no address was known for 114, and follow-up materials were re-
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Subjects
The subjects of the present study were the 185 children (103 girls, 82
boys) whose preschool delay behavior was observed in a standard self-
imposed delay situation as described below and whose parent(s) re-
turned any of the follow-up measures in either of the two waves of
follow-up assessments. Although a minority of subjects had more than
one delay experience, we used only their first exposure to a delay situa-
tion to avoid possible reactive effects (as discussed in Mischel et al.,
1988). The mean age of the present sample at the time of experimental
assessment of delay of gratification was 4 years, 4 months. The chil-
dren were preschoolers in the Bing School of Stanford University, a
preschool for mostly middle-class children of faculty and students
from the Stanford University community. Their mean delay time was
512.8 s, with a standard deviation of 368.7 s. The mean age of those
who responded to the first follow-up (conducted in 1981 -1982) was 1S
years, 9 months, and the mean age at the time of the second follow-up
(conducted in 1984) was 18 years, 3 months. Parents of 67 of these
children (35 girls, 32 boys) returned the CCQ in the first mailing, and
parents of 100 children (58 girls, 42 boys) returned the CCQ in the
second mailing. Parents of 2 children received and returned the CCQ
in both mailings, making the number of subjects for whom the CCQ
was available from either of the mailings a total of 165 (92 girls, 73
boys). Parents of 134 children (78 girls, 56 boys) returned the ACQ
(described below), and parents of 94 children reported SAT scores.
Assessment of Delay of Gratification Behavior
Delay of gratification was assessed in various versions of the basic
self-imposed delay waiting paradigm described in detail elsewhere
(Mischel, 1974; Mischel et al, 1972). Children were escorted individu-
ally into an experimental room in the Bing School, played briefly with
some toys with the experimenter, and were told they would play with
them more later. The child was then seated at a table on which there
was a bell, and was shown reward objects determined by pretest to vary
in desirability (e.g., one small marshmallow vs. two, one small stick
pretzel vs. two, one colored plastic poker chip vs. two). The particular
objects in the contingency varied from study to study, but the items in
each pair were all pretested to be of age-appropriate interest and to be
sufficiently close in value to create a conflict for young children be-
tween the temptation to stop the delay and the desire to persist for the
preferred outcome when the latter required delay. The experimental
room was deliberately stripped of distractors. After asking which of
the objects in the choice (e.g, one or two marshmallows) the subject
preferred, the experimenter introduced the child to the contingency:
The experimenter indicated that she or he had to go out of the room
then but that "if you wait until I come back by myself then you can
have this one [pointing to the preferred object]. If you dont want to
wait you can ring the bell and bring me back any time you want to. But
if you ring the bell then you can't have this one [pointing to the pre-
ferred object], but you can have that one [pointing to the less preferred
object]."
After testing the child's comprehension of the contingency, the ex-
perimenter left the room and returned when the subject rang the bell or
reached a predetermined criterion time (usually 15 min, but sometimes
20 min, depending on the particular study). The time until the child
turned by the post office as undeliverable for an additional 32. Thus,
404 subjects probably received our follow-up material (barring unre-
ported mail loss), of which the present sample of 185 represents a re-
turn rate of 46%. The 185 subjects in the present sample delayed an
average of 62 s longer than the 219 who did not respond to our mailing
(512.8 s vs. 450.7 s), but the difference was not significant at the .05
level, /(402) = 1.7, p=.09.
rang the bell was measured in seconds. In the present data analysis, to
allow combining data across studies, delay times exceeding 15 min
were truncated at 15 min.
Four Types of Delay Situations
To test the hypotheses described earlier, subjects were divided into
four groups, defined by the two major features of the delay situation:
whether rewards were exposed or obscured and whether or not any
ideation instructions were given suggesting what the child might think
about during the delay period. The number of subjects in each of these
four groups is shown in Table 1.
Subjects in the four groups should not have differed systematically
in sample characteristics observable at the time of the original experi-
ments because they had been assigned randomly into experimental
conditions. In fact, the proportion of the sexes in the four groups was
not significantly different, x2(3, N = 185) = 2.87, p > .40, and a Sex X
Condition analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed no significant main
effect of sex, F(l, 174) = 0.45, p> .50, condition, F(13,174) = .94, p >
.40, or Sex x Condition, FQ, 174) = 0.47, p > .70, on the age at which
delay time was measured. With delay time as the dependent variable, a
Sex X Condition ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of condition,
FQ, 174) = 4.3, p < .01, as expected, whereas no other effects were
significant. The mean delay times reported in Table 1 confirm that
when no cognitive and attentional strategies were suggested, delay was
more difficult when the rewards were exposed (e.g, Mischel, 1974).
The skewness of the distribution of delay times did not significantly
differ from 0 in any of the four conditions.
The Adolescent Coping Questionnaire
To assess the subjects' cognitive and coping competencies and self-
control skills in adolescence, a 14-item questionnaire was sent to all of
the parents who were contacted in the second wave; it was returned for
134 children. The 14 items are listed verbatim in Table 2; they were
given with the following instructions:
In this section we want you to think about your child in compari-
son to his or her peers, such as classmates and other same-age
friends. We would like to get your impression of how your son or
daughter compares to those peers, each time on a rating scale of
1-9. Record your answers in the space provided by writing in the








The CCQ is an age-appropriate modification of the California Q-set
consisting of 100 widely ranging, personality-relevant items. It was in-
cluded in our research because of its extensive previous use in studies
of personality coherence and in the assessment of long-term correlates
of various aspects of the young child's delay of gratification (Funder,
Block, & Block, 1983). In the first mailing, parents of 67 subjects in the
present subsample returned the CCQ (46 subjects were described by
both parents, 3 by father only, and 18 by mother only). In the second
mailing, parents of 100 subjects returned the CCQ (64 subjects were
described by both parents, 9 by father only, and 27 by mother only).
When both father and mother returned the CCQ describing their
child, a composite CCQ description was formed by averaging the fa-
ther's and mother^ descriptions. With an exception of two cases, there
was no overlap of subjects between the first and the second mailing (in
the second mailing, we did not send the CCQ to those subjects who
returned it in the first mailing). Thus, a total of 165 subjects were
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Table 1
























































* Subjects for whom at least one of the follow-up measures was obtained.
described using the CCQ by both parents (110 subjects), by father only
(11 subjects), or by mother only (44 subjects).
In the first mailing, parents were sent 100 cards, each printed with
one of the CCQ items, and sorted the cards into nine equally sized piles
(11 items in each, except for 12 items in the middle pile) according to
the items' descriptiveness for their child. Parents then returned the
piles of cards in separate envelopes marked Pile 1 to Pile 9. Each child
received a score for each of the items according to the pile in which the
item was placed (i.e., if Item 25, uses and responds to reason, was re-
turned in Envelope 6, the child received a score of 6 for CCQ Item 25).
Because this procedure is time-consuming for parents and because we
wanted to increase the likelihood of returns in the second follow-up
mailing, we presented the 100 items as questionnaire items, and the
parents simply rated their children on each item using a scale of 1 to 9,
indicating how descriptive each item was for their child, without forc-
ing a predetermined distribution of scores.
This procedural difference created the possibility that, depending
on how willing they were to give extreme (e.g, 1 or 9) scores, the parents
in the second mailing used more or less of the scale compared with
parents who used a forced distribution in the first mailing. Therefore,
before combining the Q-sort data on the basis of the two mailings,
these data were first standardized within any given "profile" of a child.
Specifically, for each CCQ "profile" given by a single rater (i.e, de-
scription of a child through ratings given to each of the 100 CCQ
items), we calculated the mean and the standard deviation across
items. (For example, if the forced distribution had been used, the mean
would always be 5.0, and the standard deviation would always be 2.58.)
The raw ratings in a profile were then converted into "within-profile"
standard scores by subtracting the "profile mean" from each item and
dividing the remainder by the "profile standard deviation." Thus, al-
though the shapes of the distributions may have differed across raters,
all standardized profiles had the same mean and standard deviations,
as did the profiles based on the forced distribution. For the CCQ data
obtained in the first follow-up wave, the interrater (mother vs. father)
correlations for each of the 100 items ranged from .01 to .70, with a
median value of .42, yielding a median Spearman-Brown estimated
reliability of .60 for the mother-father composite. For the CCQ data
obtained in the second follow-up wave, the interrater (mother vs. fa-
ther) correlations for each of the 100 items ranged from .02 to .79, with a
median value of .40, yielding a median Spearman-Brown estimated
reliability of .58 for the mother-father composite.
CCQ Items Judged Relevant
The total of 100 CCQ items included a wide range of personality
descriptions, only some of which were expected to be relevant to chil-
dren's delay behavior in the self-imposed delay situations on the basis
of the experimental analysis of the delay process. To specify such items
a priori, we were guided by a summary of experimental findings pub-
lished in Mischel (1974) 7 years before the first wave of the follow-up
mailing. Specifically, in the last two paragraphs, Mischel (1974, pp.
287-288) outlined the cognitive and attentional factors that were
found to play important roles in determining children's delay behavior.
These two paragraphs, slightly edited for readability, were shown in
individual sessions to 7 college-educated subjects who were not psy-
chologists, were not in psychology graduate training programs, and
had no specific knowledge of the findings of the present study. After
reading these paragraphs, they were given the 100 CCQ items printed
on separate cards and were asked (with written instructions) to find 15
cards that characterize a person who is able to use the cognitive and
attentional strategies described in these two paragraphs to delay gratifi-
cation. Subjects further divided these 15 cards into three groups of 5
cards each according to their degree of relevance for the processes and
strategies described in the paragraphs. We assigned the 5 hems they
chose as most relevant a score of+3 (or - 3 , depending on whether the
expected relationship to delay ability was positive or negative), the next
5 relevant ones a score of+2 (or - 2 ) , the next 5 a score of +1 (or - 1 ) , and
the remaining 85 items a score of 0. The mean interrater agreement
(correlations computed across the 100 CCQ items) was .42, and the
Spearman-Brown estimate, based on this mean correlation, for the
reliability of the composite of 7 raters was .83. The scores given to each
item by the 7 subjects were then averaged, and all items with a mean
relevance score of 1.0 or greater (regardless of sign) were chosen as items
theoretically expected to be related to the abilities that underlie effec-
tive delay of gratification in self-imposed delay situations. There were
11 such items, shown in Table 3 in descending order of their degree of
relevance.
SAT Verbal and Quantitative Scores
On the biographical information sheet included in the mailings,
parents were asked to provide their children's SAT verbal and quantita-
tive scores, when available. Parents of 94 children reported SAT scores.
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To assess the reliability of the parental reports of SAT scores, we also
contacted the Educational Testing Service (ETS). On the basis of the
names and birth dates, ETS located in its data bases scores for 69 of
these 94 subjects. Because of the confidentiality of the SAT scores,
scores found by ETS could not be released in ways that allowed match-
ing with the identity of individual children. However, by supplying
parent-reported SAT scores to ETS before the data-base search, ETS
could match these scores with the scores in the ETS data bases. The
parent-reported SAT scores and the corresponding scores found in the
data bases were then released without any identifying information and
with the order of subjects randomized (but with the correspondence
between the parent- and the ETS-supplied scores kept intact). The
correlation was .94 between the scores found in the ETS data bases and
the ones reported by the parents. Although these 69 subjects located by
ETS may include some "false matches" (i.e, different children with the
same first and last names and birth dates as our subjects), the high
correlation suggests that the parent-supplied SAT scores were gener-
ally accurate for the majority of the subjects. To avoid the possibility of
including false matches, all SAT results reported here are based on the
scores supplied by parents.
Results
Adolescent Coping Questionnaire
The correlations between preschool delay time in the four
types of waiting situations and parental ratings of the children
as adolescents are shown in Table 2. In the exposed-rewards-
spontaneous-ideation condition, 12 of the 14 ratings of the chil-
dren as adolescents were statistically significant. For example,
those who delayed longer in preschool were rated as more likely
to exhibit self-control in frustrating situations, less likely to
yield to temptation, more intelligent, and less distractable
when trying to concentrate. In contrast, in the other conditions,
of the 42 correlations calculated with preschool delay time (14
items X 3 conditions), only 3 reached statistical significance
(p < .05).
SAT Scores
The results also allow us to examine potential links between
preschool delay time in the various conditions and the chil-
dren's SAT Verbal and Quantitative scores, as shown in Table 4.
Because SAT scores were not available for all subjects, in some
conditions the sample sizes became barely sufficient for a
meaningful computation of correlations. Nevertheless, the ob-
served differences between the conditions are consistent with
the results obtained with the rating measures. As expected, pre-
school delay time correlated positively with SAT when the re-
wards were exposed and no strategies were suggested. In con-
trast, correlations were negative and statistically insignificant
in the other conditions.2
To more closely assess the nature of the competencies in
adolescence predicted by preschool waiting time, and in partic-
ular to estimate which of the significant correlations with paren-
tal rating measures may reflect such school-related achieve-
ments and abilities as assessed by SAT scores, partial correla-
tions between delay time and parental ratings were computed,
controlling for both verbal and quantitative SAT scores. After
the variance attributable to SAT was partialed out, of the 11
CCQ items judged relevant (see Table 3), the following re-
mained significantly correlated with delay time (p < .05, df=
29): uses andresponds to reason (r= .40); is planful, thinksahead
(r = .38); and tends to go to pieces under stress, becomes rattled
anddisorganized(r= -.36). The correlation between preschool
delay time and the item is unable to delay gratification remained
virtually unchanged (r = —.33). On the ACQ, 2 items remained
significant ( p < .05, df= 23): how likely is your child to exhibit
self-control in frustrating situations? (r = .47) and when trying to
concentrate, how distractable is your son or daughter? (r = -.54).
Thus, although the association between preschool delay time
and ratings of academically oriented intelligence shares com-
mon variance with SAT scores, the correlation with the ratings
of children's ability to cope with social and personal problems
cannot be attributed entirely to their school-related ability or
"intelligence" as assessed by the SAT.
California Child Q-Set
Table 3 presents the correlations between preschool delay
time and the 11 CCQ items that were judged relevant to the
basic cognitive and attentional processes in the self-imposed
delay of gratification situation, as described in the Method sec-
tion.
When the rewards were exposed for attention during the de-
lay period and when ideation was spontaneous, children who
delayed longer tended to be rated higher on such relevant CCQ
items as is planful, thinks ahead, is attentive and able to concen-
trate, and uses and responds to reason. These same long-waiting
children tended to be rated lower on such relevant items as is
unable to delay gratification and tends to go to pieces under
stress, becomes rattled and disorganized. In contrast, when the
rewards were obscured and no ideation was suggested (the con-
dition expected to be unpredictive), none of the 11 relevant
items correlated significantly with preschool delay time. In con-
ditions in which ideation was suggested, none of the 11 relevant
items were significant.
Alternative Analyses
The results reported so far were based on the children's delay
times with the rewards exposed or obscured and with or with-
out ideation suggestions. However, beyond these consider-
ations, the experiments also manipulated a number of other
factors, for example, varying the types of strategies suggested
from those that make delay easier (e.g, mentally transforming
the rewards into an abstract, nonarousing representation) to
those that make delay more difficult (e.g., thinking about the
rewards in a consummatory, arousing way). Although those ma-
nipulations were the focus of the initial experiments, in the
2 The only notable sex difference in the longitudinal correlates on
any of the measures occurred for SAT verbal scores. Although pre-
school delay time did not predict these scores among boys in the ex-
posed-reward-spontaneous-ideation condition (r = .02, N = 17), it was
predictive for girls (r = .74, N - 18), and the difference was statistically
significant (z = 2.50, p < .05). However, the difference was smaller and
insignificant for SAT quantitative scores (boys: r = .40; girls: r = .71).
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Table 2
Correlations Between Preschool Delay Time and the Adolescent Coping Questionnaire
Spontaneous ideation Suggested ideation









How likely is your child to be sidetracked by
minor setbacks?
How likely is your child to exhibit self-control in
frustrating situations?
How well does your child cope with important
problems?
How capable is your child of doing well
academically when motivated?
How likely is your child to yield to temptation?
Faced with a choice. . . how likely is your child
to settle for the immediate [but less
desirable] one?
How able is your child to pursue his or her goals
when motivated?
How intelligent is your child?
When motivated, how capable is your child of
exhibiting self-control in tempting
situations?
How skilled is your son or daughter at
maintaining friendships and getting along
with peers?
When trying to concentrate, how distractible is
your son or daughter?
How capable is your child of exhibiting self-
control when frustrated?
How effectively does your child typically pursue
goals?
How well can your child divert attention from
the frustrativeness of having to postpone
































































present analysis of individual differences they essentially con-
stitute random "noise." Accordingly, as an alternative to using
the actual delay times, one could also statistically remove the
experimental "noise" by subtracting from each subject's delay
time the expected delay time for the type of delay situation in
which he or she waited. Such expected delay times can be ap-
proximated by averaging the delay times in each distinct type
of delay situation, although the number of subjects for many
types of situations was very low (e.g, less than 5) after eliminat-
ing those subjects who had already participated in other types
of delay situations. The results after this procedure were vir-
tually identical to those reported in Tables 2 to 4. The number
of significant correlates among the items of the ACQ in each
condition remained the same, with the exception of one less
significant correlation in the obscured-rewards-spontaneous-
ideation condition. With regard to the SAT scores, the results
were again virtually identical except that the negative (but not
significant) correlations reported in Table 4 became somewhat
weaker. For the 11 CCQ items judged to be relevant, the num-
ber of significant correlates remained the same in each condi-
tion except that in the obscured-rewards-suggested-ideation
condition an additional item (overreacts to minor frustration)
was negatively and significantly correlated with delay time.
Thus, both the results using actual delay times and those ad-
justed for experimental main effects were extremely similar.
Discussion
Identifying the Locus of Predictability
The obtained results help to specify when individual differ-
ences in preschool delay of gratification in the present para-
digm are predictive of later competence and coping. Expecta-
tions for the specific "diagnostic" condition were based on
previous experimental analyses of the role of attention and ide-
ation during delay, as discussed earlier. Consistent with these
expectations, when no strategies were suggested to the child,
ratings of cognitive, self-regulatory, and coping competence, as
well as SAT scores obtained years later, were significantly pre-
dicted by preschool delay time when the rewards were exposed
during the delay period, but not when they were obscured.3
3 This pattern of results is also consistent with an unpublished ear-
lier study (Zeiss & Mischel, 1982) showing that parents' estimates of
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Table 3
Correlations Between Preschool Delay Time and the Parent's Q-Sort
Ratings on Items Judged Relevant
California Child Q-sort items
Is persistent in activities; does not give up easily.
Is planful, thinks ahead.
Is creative in perception, thought, work, or play.
Is attentive and able to concentrate.
Is reflective; thinks and deliberates before
speaking or acting.
Uses and responds to reason.
Is stubborn.
Is unable to delay gratification, cannot wait for
satisfactions.
Tends to go to pieces under stress, becomes rattled
and disorganized.
Overreacts to minor frustrations; is easily irritated
and/or angered.
Becomes anxious when the environment is












































































In conditions in which various cognitive strategies had been
deliberately suggested to the children for use during the waiting
period, their own self-instructions and cognitive activities were
not entirely spontaneous, and we expected that their delay time
would less clearly reflect their ability to generate such strate-
gies. Indeed, when ideation strategies were suggested, pre-
school delay time did not strongly or consistently predict later
ratings of self-control, SAT scores, or relevant CCQ items.
Comparisons Across Follow-Up Waves
The present findings provided a more specific analysis than
was possible in the earlier study that used the first, smaller
sample (Mischel et al, 1988). In that study, children's preschool
delay behavior was significantly related to adolescent out-
comes, without taking specific conditions into account. If
"diagnosticity" occurs primarily when rewards are exposed and
ideation is spontaneous, as the results of the present study sug-
gest, why was delay time correlated significantly with many
items in the earlier study, which collapsed the conditions?
When the earlier, smaller sample was examined with regard to
conditions, the number of children in each condition became
too small, of course, for confident comparisons. With this in
mind, consider first the 4-item coping measure available in the
first-wave follow-up, a predecessor of the 14-item expanded ver-
sion used in the present study. On the 4-item measure, the only
significant correlation of preschool delay of gratification behav-
how long their preschool child will wait correlated significantly with
the child's concurrent delay time in a exposed-rewards condition (r =
.32, iV= 59, p < .05) but not in a obscured-rewards condition (r = - . 13,
Ar=29,/>>.10).
ior (with academic competence, r = .73, N= 13, p < .01) was
obtained in the exposed-rewards-spontaneous-ideation condi-
tion. With regard to the CCQ items, there appeared to be strong
relations between delay time and a number of the items in most
conditions. As the sample size increased with the second-wave
follow-up, however, most of these correlations proved to be
insignificant, with the notable exception of the theoretically
predicted condition described in the present study.
It is not clear whether the weakening of these correlations in
the "nondiagnostic" conditions reflects any systematic differ-
ences between those who responded in the first mailing and
those who responded only in the second mailing. There are a
number of differences between the first and the second follow-
up: Children were older at the time of the second follow-up, and
therefore the time span from their preschool delay experiment
was greater; the mean preschool delay time of the children of
the second follow-up sample was somewhat shorter (see Note 1);
the 14-item ACQ was introduced for the first time in the second
Table 4
Correlations Between Preschool Delay Time and
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mailing; and, as mentioned in the Method section, the CCQ
was administered without forced distribution in the second
mailing. It is possible that these factors reduced the correlations
between preschool and adolescence in general. However, there
is no reason why any of these factors should be expected to
affect longitudinal predictability differently for children who
happened to have been in different preschool delay conditions.
The findings of theoretical interest, for example, the difference
in adolescent correlates of preschool delay in the rewards-ex-
posed and the rewards-obscured conditions when no ideation
was suggested, thus do not seem interpretable as due to possible
differences in the samples and adolescent measures used in the
two follow-up mailings.
Nature of the Long-Term Links
We must emphasize the need for caution in the interpretation
of the total findings linking preschool delay to adolescent out-
comes. This caution applies especially in the interpretation of
the associations between preschool delay in the exposed-re-
wards-spontaneous-ideation condition and SAT scores. On the
one hand, our faith in the validity of the links between pre-
school delay behavior and later relevant competencies is
strengthened because the objective test results were consistent
with the parental rating data. On the other hand, even the high-
est correlations account for only about 25% of the variance. In
addition, given the smallness of the sample, the obtained coeffi-
cients could very well exaggerate the magnitude of the true
association. For example, in the diagnostic condition, the 95%
confidence interval for the correlation of preschool delay time
with SAT verbal score ranges from .10 to .66, and with SAT
quantitative score, the confidence interval ranges from .29 to
.76. The value and importance given to SAT scores in our cul-
ture make caution essential before generalizing from the pres-
ent study; at the very least, further replications with other popu-
lations, cohorts, and testing conditions seem necessary next
steps.
We also do not wish to overgeneralize or overstate the role of
reward exposure. Although reward exposure seems to create a
more diagnostic condition for assessing the competencies of
interest, these results were obtained from a population of mid-
dle-class preschool children not selected for any self-regulatory
difficulties, in a relatively narrow age span (mean age = 4 years,
4 months; SD = 6 months). As children become older, their
delay behavior rapidly becomes less responsive to this manipu-
lation, and it may lose its diagnostic potential early in the
course of development. Many children become aware of basic
rules to facilitate delay, for example, by distracting their atten-
tion from the rewards quite early in development (Mischel &
Mischel, 1983), and can purposefully influence their own ide-
ation to overcome the impact of exposed rewards. Conse-
quently, any diagnostic "window" provided by the exposed-re-
ward condition may be fragile and narrow in time. In fact, in
children 6 years of age and older, no differences in delay time
were found when rewards were exposed versus covered (Rodri-
guez, Mischel, & Shoda, 1989). It is also possible that the effects
of reward exposure interact with the particular characteristics
of the subject population, and such interactions will require
systematic exploration in future work.
A difficult question that remains is the mechanism underly-
ing the associations found between the delay behavior of the
preschool child and the subsequent outcome measures. One
contributing source may be stability in the subjects' family-me-
diated environments (e.g., Greenberger, Steinberg, & Vaux,
1982; Holahan & Moos, 1986; Lefcourt, Martin, & Saleh, 1984).
For example, stability in parental child-rearing practices and in
the psychosocial environment in the family and the community
may be a common factor underlying both preschool children's
delay of gratification behavior and their cognitive and self-regu-
latory competence in adolescence. These commonalities may
contribute to the observed long-term correlations.
In our view, the association found between preschool delay
behavior and adolescent competencies may reflect at least in
part the operation of "cognitive construction competencies"
(Mischel, 1973, pp. 265-267). In this view, the qualities that
underlie effective self-imposed delay in preschool may be cru-
cial ingredients of an expanded construct of "intelligent social
behavior" that encompasses social as well as intellectual knowl-
edge, coping, and problem-solving competencies (e.g. Brown &
DeLoache, 1978; Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1987; Flavell, 1982;
Sternberg, 1979). The fact that a wide variety of adolescent
outcomes was predicted by preschool delay behavior is consis-
tent with this interpretation because competencies are likely to
have more diverse, relatively long-term consequences than
other person variables (Mischel, 1968,1973,1990). These com-
petencies, rather than consisting of a global mental entity, may
include relatively specific component skills and processes neces-
sary for effective self-regulation (e.g, Brown & DeLoache, 1978;
Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1987). Some clues about their specific
nature come from related studies. For example, childrens' me-
tacognitive understanding that they must divert attention from
the rewards and generate distracting thoughts or must trans-
form the rewards mentally (Mischel & Mischel, 1983), and their
spontaneous execution of such strategies, was correlated with
their concurrent delay of gratification behavior (Rodriguez,
Mischel, & Shoda, 1989). These are the same components iden-
tified as relevant in the experimental studies of the delay pro-
cess itself (Mischel, 1974,1981).
Although cognitive and attentional strategies and skills play
an important role in the delay situation used in the present
study, there is also much evidence that other factors, such as
motivational and temporal considerations, expectations, and
personality variables are likewise germane for a comprehensive
analysis of delay of gratification (Funder & Block, 1989; Mis-
chel, 1958,1961a, 1961b; Mischel and Gilligan, 1964; Mischel
& Patterson, 1978; Schwartz, Schrager, & Lyons, 1983). For ex-
ample, when offered choices between less desirable but immedi-
ate outcomes and more desirable but delayed outcomes, the
decision to delay or not to delay hinges, in part, on the individ-
ual's values and expectations with regard to the specific contin-
gencies (e.g, Koriat & Nisan, 1978; Mahrer, 1956; Mischel,
1966; Mischel & Metzner, 1962; Mischel & Staub, 1965). In a
given situation, therefore, postponing gratification may or may
not be a wise or adaptive choice. However, unless children are
able to sustain delay for desired goals when they want to do so,
their freedom to make that choice risks becoming illusory.
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